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Abstract—The tremendous recent success of deep neural networks (DNNs) has sparked a surge of interest in understanding their
predictive ability. Unlike the human visual system which is able to generalize robustly and learn with little supervision, DNNs normally
require a massive amount of data to learn new concepts. In addition, research works also show that DNNs are vulnerable to
adversarial examples—maliciously generated images which seem perceptually similar to the natural ones but are actually formed to
fool learning models, which means the models have problem generalizing to unseen data with certain type of distortions. In this paper,
we analyze the generalization ability of DNNs comprehensively and attempt to improve it from a geometric point of view. We propose
adversarial margin maximization (AMM), a learning-based regularization which exploits an adversarial perturbation as a proxy. It
encourages a large margin in the input space, just like the support vector machines. With a differentiable formulation of the
perturbation, we train the regularized DNNs simply through back-propagation in an end-to-end manner. Experimental results on
various datasets (including MNIST, CIFAR-10/100, SVHN and ImageNet) and different DNN architectures demonstrate the superiority
of our method over previous state-of-the-arts. Code and models for reproducing our results will be made publicly available.
Index Terms—Large margin classifier, adversarial perturbation, generalization ability, deep neural networks
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1 INTRODUCTION
A Lthough deep neural networks (DNNs) have shownstate-of-the-art performance on a variety of challeng-
ing computer vision tasks, most of them are still ”notorious”
for requiring massive amount of training data. In addition, a
bunch of recent works also demonstrate that DNNs are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples [1], [2], [3], [4], indicating
the models have problem generalizing to unseen data with
possible types of distortions [5], [6]. These undesirable facts
motivate us to analyze the generalization ability of DNNs
and further find a principled way to improve it.
Our work in this paper stems specifically from a geomet-
ric point of view. We delve deeply into the margin of DNNs
and advocate a large margin principle for training networks.
Generally, such a principle can enhance the obtained models
over two aspects: (a). maximum margin classifiers usually
possess better generalization ability, which is both theoret-
ically guaranteed and empirically verified [7], [8], [9], [10];
and (b). they can also be naturally more robust to adversarial
examples since it takes more efforts to perturb the inputs to-
wards decision boundaries. This paper substantially extends
the work of Yan et al. published at NeurIPS 2018 [11].
The original concept of the large margin principle dates
back to last century. Novikoff, Cortes and Vapnik proved es-
sential theorems for the perceptron [12] and support vector
machines (SVMs) [7], based on a geometric margin γ and an
assumption that the training data can be separated with it:
sup
w
min
i
yif(xi, w) > γ. (1)
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Unlike the well-known scheme in linear classification [7],
the geometric margin of nonlinear DNNs scarcely has close-
form solutions, making it non-trivial to get incorporated in
the training objective. Although many attempts have been
made to pursue this target, most of them just focus on a
margin in the representation space (a.k.a, feature space) [13],
[14], [15], [16]. Learned representations in such a manner
may show better intra-class compactness and inter-class
discriminability, but in practice a large margin in the feature
space itself does not necessarily guarantee a large margin in
the input space [17], on account of the distance distortions
of nonlinear hierarchical models. To address this problem,
several recent methods have been developed to suggest a
large margin directly in the input space. For example, An et
al. [17] study contractive mappings in DNNs and propose
contractive rectifier networks, while Sokolic´ et al. [18] try
penalizing the Frobenius norm of a Jacobian matrix instead.
These methods show significantly superior performance in
scenarios where for instance the amount of training data
is severely limited. However, aggressive assumptions and
approximations seem inevitable in their implementations,
making them less effective in practical scenarios where the
assumptions are not really satisfied.
In this paper, we propose adversarial margin maximiza-
tion (AMM), a learning-based regularization that exploits
an adversarial perturbation as a proxy of γ. Our core idea is
to incorporate an l2 norm-based adversarial attack into the
training process, and leverage its perturbation magnitude
as an estimation of the geometric margin. Current state-
of-the-art attacks typically achieve ∼100% success rate on
powerful DNNs [3], [19], [20], while the norm of perturba-
tion can be reasonably small and thus fairly close to the real
margin values. Since the adversarial perturbation is also pa-
rameterized by the network parameters (including weights
and biases), our AMM regularizer can be jointly learned
with the original objective through back-propagation. We
conduct extensive experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10/100,
SVHN and ImageNet datasets to testify the effectiveness
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2of our method. The results demonstrate that our AMM
significantly improves the test-set accuracy of a variety of
DNN architectures, indicating an enhanced generalization
ability as the training-set accuracies remain similar.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce representative margin-based methods
for training DNNs. In Section 3, we highlight our motivation
and describe our AMM in detail. In Section 4 we experi-
mentally validate the effectiveness of our proposed method.
Finally, Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2 RELATED WORK
Margin-based methods have a long research history in the
field of pattern recognition and machine learning. Theo-
retical relationships between the generalization ability and
geometric margin of linear classifiers have been compre-
hensively studied [8] and the idea of leveraging large mar-
gin principle and constructing maximal margin separating
hyperplane [8] also act as essential ingredients of many
classical learning machines, c.f. the famous SVM [7].
Benefit from its solid theoretical foundation and intuitive
geometric explanations, the large margin principle has been
widely applied to a variety of real-world applications such
as face detection [21], text classification [22], gene selection
for cancer classification [23], etc. Nevertheless, there is as of
yet few methods for applying such principle to DNNs which
are ubiquitous tools for solving modern machine learning
and pattern recognition tasks (but are also structurally very
complex and generally considered as black-boxes). This is
mostly because the margin cannot be calculated analytically
in general as with SVM.
In view of such opportunities and challenges, one line
of researches targets at improving a ”margin” in the repre-
sentation space of DNNs instead. For instance, Tang [13] re-
places the final softmax layer with a linear SVM to maximize
a margin in the last layer. Hu et al. [14] propose a discrimina-
tive learning method for deep face verification, by enforcing
the distance between each positive pair in the representation
space to be smaller than a fixed threshold, and that to be
larger than another threshold for all negative pairs, where a
margin is naturally formed. A similar strategy, first invented
by Weinberger et al. [24] and dubbed as triplet loss, has also
been widely adopted to many face recognition systems, e.g.,
FaceNet [25]. Sun et al. [26] theoretically study a margin in
the output layer of DNNs, and propose a way of reducing
empirical margin errors. In the same spirit, Wang et al. [16]
propose to further enhance the discriminability of DNN
features via an ensemble strategy.
Stick with the representation space, some recent works
also advocate large margins under different “metrics”, e.g.,
cosine similarity [27] and the angular distance between logit
vectors and the ground-truth [15], [28], [29]. In essence, these
methods maximize the inter-class variance while minimiz-
ing the intra-class variance, and thus the learned represen-
tations can be more discriminative. However, as previously
discussed [17], owing to the high structural complexity of
DNNs and possible distance distortions of nonlinear mod-
els, a large margin in the feature space does not necessarily
assure a large margin in the input space. That being said,
the aforementioned benefits in Section 1 are not guaranteed.
See section 4 for some empirical analyses. It is also worthy
of mentioning that some previous works suggest that DNNs
trained using stochastic gradients converge to large margin
classifiers, but the convergence speed is very slow [30], [31].
A few attempts have also been made towards enlarging
the margin in input spaces. In a recent work, An et al. [17]
propose contractive rectifier networks, in which the input
margin is proved to be bounded from below by an output
margin which is inherently easier to optimize by leveraging
off-the-shelf methods like SVM. Sokolic´ et al. [18] reveal
connections between the spectral norm of a Jacobian matrix
and margin, and try to regularize a simplified version of its
Frobenius norm. Contemporaneous with our work, Elsayed
et al. [32] propose to use a one-step linear approximation
to DNN mappings and enlarge the margin explicitly. These
methods are closely related to ours, but their implementa-
tions require rough approximations and can be suboptimal
in many practical applications. Some detailed discussions
are deferred to Section 3.3.4 and experimental results for
comparing with them will be provided in Section 4. Ding et
al. [33] also aim to approximate the margin more accurately
but their method differs with ours in multiple ways as will
be discussed in the Appendix.
3 ADVERSARIAL MARGIN MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we introduce our method for pursuing large
margin in DNNs. First, we briefly review our recent work of
deep defense [11] aimed at training DNNs with improved
adversarial robustness. We believe its functionality can be
naturally regarded as maximizing the margin. We then for-
malize the definition of margin and provide discussions of
the generalization ability based on it. Finally, we introduce
our AMM for improving the generalization ability of DNNs.
3.1 Our Deep Defense
Deep Defense improves the adversarial robustness of DNNs
by endowing models with the ability of learning from
attacks [11]. On account of the high success rate and rea-
sonable computation complexity, it chooses DeepFool [3] as
a backbone and tries to enlarge the lp norm of its perturba-
tions. 1
Suppose a binary classifier f : Rm → R, where the input
x is an m-dimensional vector and the predictions are made
by taking the sign of classifier’s outputs. DeepFool generates
the perturbation ∆x with an iterative procedure. At the i-
th step (0 ≤ i < u), the perturbation r(i) is obtained by
applying first-order approximation to f and solving:
min
r
‖r‖p s.t. f(x+ ∆(i)x ) +∇f(x+ ∆(i)x )T r = 0, (2)
where ∇f denotes ∂f(x)∂x , and ∆(i)x :=
∑i−1
j=0 r
(j). Problem
(2) can be solved analytically:
r(i) = − f(x+ ∆
(i)
x )
‖∇f(x+ ∆(i)x )‖22
∇f(x+ ∆(i)x ). (3)
1. There exist stronger attacks which approximate the margin more
precisely (like the Carlini and Wagner’s [19]), but they are computation-
ally more complex; we have demonstrated that defending DeepFool
helps to defend Carlini and Wagner’s attack [11] as well therefore it can
be a reasonable proxy.
3After computing all the r(i)s sequentially, the final DeepFool
perturbation ∆x is obtained by adding up the r(i)s obtained
from each step:
∆x = r
(0) + ...+ r(u−1), (4)
where u is the maximum iteration allowed. If the prediction
class of f changes at any iteration before the u-th, the
loop should terminate in advance. Such procedure directly
generalizes to multi-class cases, as long as a target label is
properly chosen at each iteration. Given a baseline network,
the procedure may take about 1-3 iterations to converge on
small datasets such as MNIST/CIFAR-10, and 3-6 iterations
on large datasets like ImageNet [34]2.
3.1.1 Regularization and High Order Gradients
In fact, the `p norm of ∆x is a popular metric for evaluating
the adversarial attacks and the robustness of DNNs [3],
[19], [35]. Given an input vector x, the gradient ∇f(x), as
well as the perturbation ∆x, are both parameterized by the
learnable parameters of f . Consequently, in order to give
preference to those f functions with stronger robustness,
one can simply penalize the norm of ∆x as a regularization
term during training. With modern deep learning frame-
works such as PyTorch [36] and TensorFlow [37], differenti-
ating ∆x can be done via automatic derivation with higher
order gradients. One might also achieve this by building a
“reverse” network to mimic the backward process of f , as
described in [11].
We emphasize the high order gradients form an essential
component in our method and. In principle, if no gradient
flows through∇f , the regularization can be viewed as max-
imizing the norm in a normalized logit space, given ‖∇f‖ as
the normalizer. Considering possible distance distortions of
nonlinear hierarchical DNNs, it is definitely less effective in
influencing the perturbation or whatever else. Experimental
analysis will be further given in Section 4.3.1 to verify the
importance of the high order gradients.
3.1.2 Correctly and Incorrectly Classified Samples
Deep Defense applies different regularization strategies on
correctly and incorrectly classified samples. Specifically, if
an input is correctly classified during training, we expect
it to be pushed further away from the decision boundary,
thus a smaller value of ‖∆x‖p is anticipated. In practice, the
target class at each iteration is chosen to be the one results
in the smallest r(i). Conversely, if an input is misclassified
by the current model, we instead expect it to be closer to the
decision boundary (between its current prediction and the
ground-truth label), since we may intuitively hope the input
sample to be correctly classified by the model in the future.
The target class is always set to be the ground-truth and a
larger value of ‖∆x‖p is anticipated.
In summary, the Deep Defense regularizer can be written
as:
LDD =
∑
k∈T
R
(
−c‖∆xk‖p‖xk‖p
)
+
∑
k∈F
R
(
d
‖∆xk‖p
‖xk‖p
)
, (5)
2. For example, it convergences within 3 iterations on all the MNIST
images with a 5-layer LeNet reference model, and 6 iterations on 99.63%
of the ImageNet images with a ResNet-18 reference model.
or similarly
LDD =
1
n
∑
k∈T
R (−c‖∆xk‖p) +
1
n
∑
k∈F
R (d‖∆xk‖p) , (6)
where n is the number of training samples, T is the index
set of correctly classified training examples, F is its comple-
ment, c, d > 0 are two hyper-parameters balancing these
two groups of samples, R is the shrinkage function that
balances examples within the same group (details in Section
3.3). The sets T and F are updated in each training iteration.
The whole optimization problem is given by:
min
W
∑
k
L(yk, f(xk;W)) + λLDD + αLWD, (7)
where L is the original classification objective (e.g., cross-
entropy or hinge loss), λ is the coefficient for regularizer,
and αLWD is the weight decay term. We adopt the unnor-
malized version (6) in this paper, since it connects the most
to the margin to be defined in Section 3.2, and further the
generalization ability.
3.2 Margin, Robustness and Generalization
Deep defense achieves remarkable performance on resist-
ing different adversarial attacks. Apart from the improved
robustness, we also observe increased inference accuracies
on the benign test-sets (cf., the fourth column of Table 1 in
the paper [11]). We believe the superiority of our inference
accuracies is related to the nature of large margin principle.
In order to analyze the conjecture in detail, we first formalize
the definition of an instance-specific margin and introduce
some prior theoretical results [10] as below.
Definition 3.1. Let us denote by g : Rm → {±1} a decision
function, then the instance-specific margin γpx of a sam-
ple x ∈ Rm w.r.t. g is the minimal `p distance from x to
the decision boundary.
Definition 3.2. [10] Let Sn be a sampled training set, and l
be the loss function. An algorithm is (K, (Sn))-robust if
the sample space S = X × Y can be partitioned into K
disjoint sets denoted by Kk, k = 1, . . . ,K , such that for
all sj = (xj , yj) ∈ Sn and s = (x, y) ∈ S ,
sj , s ∈ Kk ⇒ |l(g(xj), yj)− l(g(x), y)| ≤ (Sn). (8)
Theorem 3.1. [10] If there exists 0 < γp < γpxj for all j, then
the learning algorithm is (2N (γp/2,X ; dp), 0)-robust, in
which N (γp/2,X ; dp) is the -covering number3 of the
input space X , and dp is the `p norm, in which the 0/1
loss l(g(xj), yj) = 1(g(xj) 6= yj) is chosen.
Theorem 3.1 establishes an intrinsic connection between
the concerned instance-specific margin and a defined “ro-
bustness”. Such robustness is different from the adversarial
robustness by definition, but it theoretically connects to the
generalization error of g, as shown in Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. [10] Let µ be the underlying distribution of the
sample (x, y). If an algorithm is (K, (Sn))-robust and
3. The definition of -covering number can be found in [38], and it is
monotonically decreasing w.r.t. its first argument.
4l(g(x), y) ≤M for all s = (x, y) ∈ S , then for any δ > 0,
with probability at least 1− δ, it holds that
GE(g) ≤ (Sn) +M
√
2K log(2) + 2 log(1/δ)
n
, (9)
in which GE(g) is the generalization error of g, given by
GE(g) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣E(x,y)∼µl(g(x), y)− 1n
∑
(xj ,yj)∈Sn
l(g(xj), yj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(10)
Theorem 3.2, along with Theorem 3.1, advocates a large
margin in the input space and guarantees the generalization
ability of learning machines. Also, it partially explains the
superiority of our Deep Defense trained DNNs on benign-
set inference accuracies. However, since the regularizer LDD
is originally designed for resisting attacks, it may be subop-
timal for improving the generalization ability (or reducing
the generalization error) of learning machines.
In fact, for linear binary classifiers where f(x) = wTx+
b, assuming the training data is fully separable, then the
regularization boils down to minimizing4:∑
k∈T
−
∣∣wTxk + b∣∣
‖w‖2 +
∑
k∈F
∣∣wTxk + b∣∣
‖w‖2 . (11)
Since scaling (w, b) by any positive scalar t does not change
the value of our regularization term, we constrain ‖w‖2 = 1
to make the problem well-posed. We denote the index set of
samples from positive class and negative class by S+n and
S−n , respectively, and further assume the number of training
samples in positive and negative classes to be identical (i.e.,
|S+n | = |S−n |), then Eq. (11) can be rewritten as:
wT
 ∑
k∈S−n
xk −
∑
k∈S+n
xk
 , (12)
in which the bias term b has been canceled out. Obviously,
minimizing Eq. (12) under the constraint ‖w‖2 = 1 yields
w∗ = (
∑
k∈S+n xk −
∑
k∈S−n xk)/Z , where Z is a normal-
izer to make sure ‖w∗‖2 = 1. Geometrically, the decision
boundary corresponding to calculating w∗ is orthogonal to
the line segment connecting the centers of mass of positive
training samples and that of negative training samples. Note
that all training samples in (12), no matter how far away
from the decision boundary, have equal contribution to w∗.
An undesired consequence of such formulation is that, the
regularizer can be severely influenced by samples not really
close to the decision boundary. As a result, such w∗ may
process a poor global margin γp, since γp is generally the
“worst-case” distance from training samples to the decision
boundary, dominated mainly by those close to it.
3.3 Our Main Framework
We know from the previous section that although the mar-
gin, robustness and generalization ability of DNNs are theo-
retically connected, there is an intrinsic distinction between
our current method and a desired margin maximization. In
4. We choose λ = c = d = 1, and R(t) = t for simplicity.
this section, we provide further analyses and introduce ag-
gregation function (in Section 3.3.1) and shrinkage function
(in Section 3.3.2) designed specifically to exploit the large
margin principle more effectively in practice.
3.3.1 Aggregation Function
Deep Defense in Eq. (6) aggregates regularization informa-
tion from training samples (in a batch) by taking average.
However, this aggregation strategy can be suboptimal for
improving the generalization ability, while Theorem 3.2 also
suggests a minimal perturbation (rather than the adopted
average). Ideally, one can apply regularization only on the
sample with minimal perturbation over the whole training
set to maximize γp = minj γpxj . Nevertheless, the gradient
of such a regularizer will be zero for most of the training
samples, and in practice it takes much longer time to train
and achieve satisfactory results. This is different from the well-
known scheme in linear SVM.
To achieve a reasonable trade-off between the theoretical
requirement and regularization strength, we consider using
a MIN aggregation function within each batch instead of the
whole training set during training. Specifically, for correctly
classified samples xk we apply regularization to it iff two
conditions are fulfilled simultaneously: (a). ‖∆xk‖ is the
smallest among all samples with the same ground-truth
label in this batch, and (b). ‖∆xk‖ belongs to the top 20%
smallest in this batch. If a correctly classified sample does
not satisfy these two conditions, we simply set its regular-
ization term to zero in the current training step. While if a
sample is misclassified by the current model, we expect to
decrease its distances to the correct predictions. Analogous
to the above codec for MIN, we denote the original Deep
Defense strategy (i.e., averaging all) as AVG.
3.3.2 Shrinkage Function
As discusses [11], if we penalize an perturbation directly
(i.e., setting R(t) = t in Eq. (5) and (6)), some “extremely
robust” samples may dominate the regularization term,
which shall pose a negative impact on the training pro-
cedure. What’s worse, the regularization term will never
diminish to zero with a linear R(·). To alleviate the prob-
lems, we attempt to choose a nonlinear ”shrinkage” func-
tion for R(·). It should be monotonically increasing, such
that the correctly classified samples with abnormally small
‖∆xk‖ are penalized more than those with relatively large
values. Essentially, concentrating more on samples with
small instance-specific margins coheres with the evidence in
Theorem 3.2, since we know the minimal (instance-specific)
margin probably connects the most to the generalization
ability. We will demonstrate the performance of different
choices: (a). R(t) = t, denoted by LIN, (b). R(t) = exp(t),
denoted by EXP and (c), R(t) = 11−t , denoted by INV, on
training DNNs, which also differs from the well-known scheme
in linear SVM. For INV, we make sure t < 1 by setting
appropriate values for c, d and truncating abnormally large
values for ‖∆xk‖ with a threshold.
3.3.3 Experiments on Toy Data
We first conduct an explanatory experiment by synthesizing
2D data to illustrate how the choices of the functions may af-
fect classification in a binary case. Suppose that the 2D data
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Fig. 1. Different AMM configurations on synthesized 2D data for linear classifiers. (a): The AVG+LIN configuration results in a separating line which
is orthogonal to the line connecting the centers of different classes. (b), (c): By adjusting the scales of regularization term of different data points
using our non-linear shrinkage functions, we obtain decision boundaries with improved margins and better generalization ability compared with the
linear shrinkage function adopted in AVG+LIN. (d): When the regularization is only applied to samples with small (instance-specific) margins, the
learned models almost show optimal performance up to the limit on numerical precisions. The decision boundaries are plotted in red. Best viewed
in color.
from the two classes are uniformly distributed in rectan-
gles [−1.01,−4.00;−0.99, 2.00] and [0.99,−2.00; 1.01, 4.00],
respectively. For each class, we synthesize 200 samples for
training and another 200 held-out for testing. We train linear
classifiers with f(x) = wTx + b to minimize the regular-
ization term taking various forms. We set batch size to 20,
and train models for 1000 epochs with the standard SGD
optimizer. The learning rate is initially set to 0.1, and cut by
half every 250 epochs. We use the popular momentum of 0.9
and a weight decay of 1e-4.
The learned decision boundaries and in different config-
urations are illustrated in Fig. 1 together with test samples.
With purely AVG+LIN, the obtained boundary is roughly
orthogonal to the line connecting (-1.0, -1.0) and (1.0, 1.0),
which is consistent with our previous analysis in Section 3.2.
Although we have striven to penalize incorrect classifica-
tions, the obtained model in this setting is still unable to gain
excellent accuracy, because all training samples contribute
equally to pushing the decision boundary. Better general-
ization ability and thus improved test-set accuracies can
be obtained in the AVG+EXP and AVG+INV settings, as
depicted in Fig. 1 (b) and (c). This verifies the effectiveness
of the non-linear shrinkage functions aimed at regularizing
”extremely robust” samples less. It can also be seen that the
MIN aggregation function leads to a more sensible margin.
Optimal (or near optimal) boundaries are obtained in the
MIN settings, which attains the largest possible margin of 1.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the MIN aggregation function is
more related with the geometric margin in comparison with
the AVG so it can directly facilitate the margin as well as
the generalization ability.
We further conduct an experiment on MNIST [39], which
is a real-world dataset. Here a simple multilayer perceptron
(MLP) is adopted and trained with cross-entropy loss. To
achieve the best performance within each configuration, we
first run a grid search for λ, c, and d. Table 1 shows the final
error rates while Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence curves of
our AMM with different aggregation and shrinkage func-
tions. We repeat the training five times with different initial-
ization instantiations to report also the standard derivations
of error rates. We see with AVG+LIN the obtained mean
TABLE 1
Results on MNIST: Compare MLP Models Trained Using Different
Aggregation and Shrinkage Functions
Method Aggregation Shrinkage Error Rate (%)
baseline - - 1.79±0.06
AVG LIN 2.26±0.05
AVG INV 1.18±0.03
AMM AVG EXP 0.94±0.02
MIN LIN 1.28±0.02
MIN INV 0.97±0.03
MIN EXP 0.90±0.03
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Fig. 2. Convergence curves of MLP models trained using our AMM with
different aggregation and shrinkage functions on MNIST.
error rate even increases from 1.79% to 2.29% in comparison
with the reference model, proving that treating all samples
equally in the regularizer can pose negative impact on the
generalization ability. With the help of the MIN aggregation
function, our AMM achieves a 1.28% error rate, which is far
lower than that with AVG+LIN (2.26%), as well as that of
the reference model (1.79%). Such positive effect of the MIN
aggregation function is consistent with our observation on
the synthetic 2D data.
The benefit of the nonlinear shrinkage functions is also
6highlighted. When compared with the LIN function, non-
linear shrinkage functions INV and EXP gain relative error
decreases of 47% and 58% within the same AVG setting,
and 24% and 29% within the MIN setting. Such results well
explain our intuitions and insights in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.4 Implementation Details and Discussions
Our framework has an intrinsic connection with SVM. For a
linear binary classification problem with separable training
data, SVM can be viewed as a special case in our framework
provided the model is linear, if we remove the classification
objective L in the whole optimization problem (7). It can be
easily verified that the MIN+LIN regularization (along with
the weight decay term) is the equivalent with a hard margin
linear SVM, if the current model achieves excellent accuracy
(i.e.100%) on the training set and we use all training samples
in each batch. Moreover, as testified in the previous section,
the aggregation function ought to be more essential than the
shrinkage function in linear binary cases.
The landscape and margin of nonlinear DNNs are much
more complex and generally infeasible to compute in com-
parison with those of linear models, especially when multi-
ple classes get involved. Our framework exploits an adver-
sarial perturbation as a proxy of the margin. With different
configurations on the aggregation and shrinkage functions,
it formulates a variety of regularization types. They might
devote more to the generalization ability (e.g., the one with
MIN+EXP) or robustness (e.g., our Deep Defense with AVG
and approximately EXP). All the encompassed variants
share a similar core idea that is to incorporate an adversarial
attack into the training process. In particular, we utilize the
perturbation norm as an estimation of the margin. Current
state-of-the-art attacks typically achieve ∼100% success rate
on powerful DNNs, while the norm of perturbation can be
reasonably small and thus fairly close to the real margin
values. We specifically choose p = 2 to comply with previ-
ous theoretical analysis. Also, we know from Section 3.3.3
that the MIN+EXP trades off test-set performance in favor
of theoretical margins. We leave the choices for the classi-
fication objective L to customized network configurations,
in parallel with our AMM configurations. In fact, we have
tested our AMM with popular choices for L including
the cross-entropy loss and hinge loss but never found a
significant difference in the experiments.
By delving deeply into the geometric margin, we unify
a set of learning-based regularizers within the proposed
AMM framework. Guidelines are correspondingly provided
in case one prefers the generalization ability to robustness or
DNNs to linear models. Contemporaneous with our work,
Elsayed et al. [32] propose to linearize the forward mapping
of DNNs, somewhat similar to a single-step Deep Defense
without utilizing the high order gradients (as in Section 3.1)
and nonlinear shrinkage function (as in Section 3.3.2). See
more discussions in Section 4.3.1.
4 EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATIONS
In this section, we experimentally verify the remarks and
conjectures presented in previous sections and evaluate the
performance of our AMM with specifically MIN+EXP on
various datasets (including MNIST, CIFAR-10/100, SVHN
and ImageNet). We compare our derived method with the
state-of-the-arts to demonstrate its effectiveness.
4.1 Datasets and Models
We perform extensive experiments on five commonly
used classification dataset: MNIST [39], CIFAR-10/100 [40],
SVHN [41] and ImageNet [34]. Dataset and network config-
urations are described as below. For MNIST, CIFAR-10/100,
and SVHN, we construct a held-out validation set for hyper-
parameter selection by randomly choosing 5k images from
the training set. For ImageNet, as a common practice, we
train models on the 1.2 million training images, and report
top-1 error rates on the 50k validation images.
4.1.1 MNIST
MNIST consists of 70k grayscale images, in which 60k of
them are used for training and the remaining are used for
test. We train deep networks with different architectures on
MNIST: (a). a four-layer MLP (2 hidden layers, 800 neurons
in each) with ReLU activations, (b). LeNet [39] and (c). a
deeper CNN with 12 weight layers named “LiuNet” [15],
[16]. Similar to many previous works, we subtract the mean
for both training and test data in pre-processing, and no
data augmentation is adopted. For more details about these
architectures, please see our appendix.
4.1.2 CIFAR-10/100, and SVHN
Both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 contain 60k color images,
including 50k training images and 10k test images. SVHN is
composed of ∼630k color images in which ∼604k of them
are used for training and the remaining for testing. For
these datasets, we train six networks: (a). a light ConvNet
with the same architecture as in [42], (b). the network-in-
network (NIN) [43], (c). the “LiuNet“ as applied in the
CIFAR-10 experiments in [15]., (d)(e). the standard ResNet-
20/56 [44] architectures, and (f) a DenseNet-40 [45] in which
all layers are connected. We uniformly resize each image to
36x36, and randomly crop a 32x32 patch during training as
data augmentation. Moreover, we apply random horizontal
flipping with a probability of 0.5 to combat overfitting,
except SVHN.
4.1.3 ImageNet
ImageNet is a highly challenging image classification bench-
mark which consists of millions of high-resolution images
over 1,000 classes. Starting from ResNet [44], deep models
with skip connections have advanced the state-of-the-arts
on this highly challenging dataset [45], [46], [47], [48]. We
adopt ResNet-18/50 [44] and SENet-50 [48] which includes
numerous skip connections as representative architectures
to validate our method. Following previous works [49], we
randomly crop a patch whose size is uniformly distributed
between 8% and 100% of the original image size, with aspect
ratio uniformly distributed in
[
3
4 ,
4
3
]
. Then we resize the
cropped patch to 224x224 and feed it into the network.
As a common practice, random horizontal flipping is also
applied.
7TABLE 2
MNIST Test Error Rates of MLP Models w/ or w/o High Order Gradients
Model Error (%)
Reference 1.79±0.06
w/o high order gradients 1.46±0.04
w/ high order gradients 0.90±0.03
4.2 Training Protocol
We use the cross-entropy loss in the training objective for L,
as with previous works. Table 2 in the appendix summarizes
the batch size, maximal number of epoch, and learning rate
policy used in our experiments. We start training with some
initial learning rate (shown in the 5-th column of Table 2)
and we anneal them by some multipliers at certain epochs
(specified in the 6-th column). The standard stochastic gradi-
ent descent optimizer with a momentum of 0.9 and a weight
decay of 1e-4 is adopted in all experiments. All the hyper-
parameters are tuned on the validation set with reference
networks in order to achieve their supreme performance.
For relatively small models and datasets, we initialize
models with the so-called “MSRA” strategy [50] and train
from scratch, otherwise we fine-tune from our trained ref-
erence models (more details can be found in Table 2 in the
appendix). To avoid abnormally large gradients and proba-
bly a drift away of classification loss, we project gradient
tensors onto a Euclidean sphere with radius 10, if their
norm exceeds the threshold 10. This technique is also known
as “clip gradients” and has been widely adopted in the
community. When calculating adversarial perturbations for
our AMM, we allow a maximal iteration of u = 6, which is
sufficient to fool DNNs on ∼100% of the training samples
in most cases. Hyper-parameters λ, c, d in our regularizer
is determined by cross validation in the held-out validation
set, as described.
4.3 Exploratory Experiments on MNIST
As a popular dataset for evaluating the generalization per-
formance of classifiers [13], [15], [17], [42], [51], MNIST is a
reasonable choice for us to get started. We shall analyze the
impacts of different configurations in our framework.
4.3.1 Effect of High Order Gradients and Others
Let us first investigate the effect of introducing high order
gradients, which serves as an essential component in our
framework. It is triggered when back-propagating gradients
through ∇f in our regularizer, which is usually difficult to
formalize and compute for DNNs. We invoke the automatic
differentiation mechanism in PyTorch [36] to achieve this.
One can also build inverse networks to mimic the backward
process of DNNs, as in [11].
We try masking the gradient flow of ∇f by treating the
entries of ∆x as constants, as done by Elsayed et al. [32]. In
general, they expect to enlarge the margin by penalizing the
`2 norm of a linear perturbation, if it goes below a threshold.
Such approximation may lead to conceptually easier imple-
mentations but definitely also results in distinctions from
the gradient direction to pursue a large margin. With or
without the high order gradients, we obtain different MLP
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Fig. 3. Convergence curves of MLP models on MNIST with or w/o high
order gradients.
models using our AMM. They are compared in Table 2 and
Fig. 3, along with the “Reference” that indicates the baseline
MLPs with λ = 0 (i.e., no AMM). Means and standard
deviations of the error rates calculated from all five runs
are shown.
Though both methods achieve decreased error rates than
the “Reference”, models trained with gradient masked on
∇f (i.e., without high order gradients) demonstrate appar-
ently worse performance (1.46%, pink in Fig. 3) than those
with full gradients (0.90%, yellow in Fig. 3). Except for the
high order gradients, Elsayed et al.’s method [32] also miss
several other components that may further hinder it from
achieving comparable performance with ours. For empirical
validations, we try following its main technical insights and
implementing the method for empirical validation. We fol-
low the single-step setting and a threshold-based shrinkage
function and summarize its results in Table 2 and Fig. 3 for
comparison. We see its prediction error is even higher than
ours without high order gradients.
4.3.2 Training with Less Samples
Our AMM enhances the generalization ability and robust-
ness of DNNs in different aspects. We consider the pos-
sibility of training DNN models with fewer samples in
this section. Specifically, we sample {5k, 10k, 15k, . . . , 60k}
images randomly from the MNIST training set, and train
MLP models on these subsets. Once sampled, these subsets
are fixed for all training procedures. The MIN+EXP setting
and identical λ, c, and d as in our previous experiments are
adopted.
Fig. 4 illustrates how test error rates vary with the num-
ber of training samples. Same with previous experiments,
we perform five runs for each method and the shaded areas
demonstrate the standard deviations. Clearly, models with
our full gradient AMM achieve consistently better perfor-
mance than the “Reference” models and other competitors.
With only 20k training images, our method helps to achieve
1.54± 0.04% error, which is even slightly lower than that of
the vanilla models with all 60k training images (1.81±0.05%
error).
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Fig. 4. MNIST test error rates of MLP models with less training images.
4.3.3 Training with Noisy Labels
We train models with possibly noisy labels in this exper-
iment to simulate unreliable human annotations in many
real-world applications. We shall use all 60k MNIST training
images, but for a portion of them, we substitute random
integers in [0, 9] for their “ground-truth” labels. For n ∈
{0k, 5k, 10k, . . . , 55k}, we construct 12 training partitions
each consists of n images with the original labels and 60k−n
images with random labels.
The “Reference” and our AMM models are trained, and
their error rates are shown in Fig. 5. Without specific regular-
ization, error rates of reference models increase drastically
when a portion of labels are corrupted. For instance, when
training on a set containing 55k images with random labels,
models with our adversarial regularization are still able to
achieve an average test error less than 10%. However, that of
the reference models goes above 40%, which are obviously
too high, considering it is a 10-class classification problem.
Our implementation of Elsayedet al.’s method also achieves
promising performance on the test set, though consistently
inferior to ours.
4.4 Image Classification Experiments
In this section, we testify the effectiveness of our method
on benchmark DNN architectures on different image clas-
sification datasets including MNIST, CIFAR-10/100, SVHN
and ImageNet. It is compared with a variety of state-
of-the-art margin-inspired methods. Same with previous
experiments in Section 4.3, during training we adopt the
MIN+EXP regularizer in our method for all experiments.
For evaluation, both error rates and margin (estimated using
DeepFool perturbation) on the test set are reported to verify
the effectiveness of our method.
4.4.1 MNIST
Aforementioned MLP, LeNet and LiuNet architectures are
used as reference models. Generally, DNNs have to be de-
terministic during the attack process, such that we can find
a reasonable approximation of minimal distance to the fixed
decision boundaries. However, for DNNs equipped with
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Fig. 5. MNIST test error rates of MLP models with noisy training images.
TABLE 3
MNIST Test Error Rates
Method Architecture Error (%) Margin Augmentation
Bayes by Backprop [51] MLP (800) 1.32 - -
DropConnect [52] MLP (800) 1.20±0.03 - -
DLSVM [13] MLP (512) 0.87 - Gaussian
CRN [17] LeNet 0.73 - -
DropConnect [52] LeNet 0.63±0.03 - -
DisturbLabel [42] LeNet 0.63 - -
L-Softmax [15] LiuNet 0.31 - -
EM-Softmax [16] LiuNet 0.27 a - -
Reference MLP (800) 1.79±0.06 0.76 -
Ours MLP (800) 0.90±0.03 1.90 -
Reference LeNet 0.87±0.02 1.07 -
Ours LeNet 0.56±0.02 2.21 -
Reference LiuNet 0.41±0.02 1.60 -
Ours LiuNet 0.33±0.03 3.41 -
a Ensemble of 2 LiuNet models are used.
batch normalization layers, if we implement the DeepFool
attack naı¨vely, the perturbation of a particular sample may
depend on other samples in the same batch since all of them
share the same mean and variance in batch normalization
procedure. In order to bypass such dependency and achieve
better efficiency, our implementation follows that described
in [15], with one exception that we replace all batch nor-
malization layers with group normalization [53] with group
size 32. Empirically we found this difference has little (often
negative) impact on the error rates of reference network. We
adopt the MIN+EXP setting, and use λ, c, d selected on
MLPs for all the three architectures for simplicity, although
potential better hyper-parameters may be obtained by run-
ning grid search on each of them. The error rates of different
methods are shown in Table 3. For a fair comparison, we
also provide architectures in the second column of Table 3.
The annotation MLP (n) represents an MLP model with two
hidden layers, and each of them has n neurons. Our method
outperforms competitive methods considering the MLP and
LeNet architecture, except one case where comparisons are
not completely fair: DLSVM [13] obtains 0.87% error (our:
0.90%) using MLP with additional Gaussian noise added
to the input images during training, but we do not use any
data augmentation techniques,. For LiuNet, our method also
achieves comparable error rate (0.33%) with L-Softmax [15]
(0.31%). EM-Softmax [16] achieves the lowest 0.27% error
9TABLE 4
CIFAR-10 Test Error Rates
Method Architecture Error (%) Margin Augmentation
DropConnect [52] LeNet 18.7 - -
DisturbLabel [42] LeNet 14.48 - hflip & crop
DLSVM [13] LeNet 11.9 - hflip & jitter
CRN [17] VGG-16 8.8 - hflip & crop
L-Softmax [15] LiuNet 5.92 - hflip & crop
EM-Softmax [16] LiuNet 4.98 a - hflip & crop
Reference LeNet 14.93 0.16 hflip & crop
Ours LeNet 13.87 0.24 hflip & crop
Reference NIN 10.39 0.21 hflip & crop
Ours NIN 9.87 0.30 hflip & crop
Reference LiuNet 6.25 0.15 hflip & crop
Ours LiuNet 5.85 0.29 hflip & crop
Reference ResNet-20 8.20 0.10 hflip & crop
Ours ResNet-20 7.62 0.22 hflip & crop
Reference ResNet-56 5.96 0.16 hflip & crop
Ours ResNet-56 5.75 0.32 hflip & crop
Reference DenseNet-40 5.75 0.11 hflip & crop
Ours DenseNet-40 5.61 0.18 hflip & crop
a Ensemble of 2 LiuNet models are used.
using an ensemble of 2 LiuNets, while our performance is
measured on a single model. Moreover, we see our method
significantly and consistently decreases the error rates of
reference models, by relative improvements of 49%, 35%,
and 19% on MLP, LeNet, and LiuNet, respectively.
4.4.2 CIFAR-10
For CIFAR-10, we evaluate our method with LeNet, NIN,
LiuNet, ResNet-20/56, and DenseNet-40. The architecture
of LeNet and NIN are directly copied from our previ-
ous work [11], and that of LiuNet is adapted from [15].
We choose the CIFAR-10 LiuNet architecture as described
in [15], and replace all batch normalization layers with
group normalization layers of group size 32, as in our
MNIST experiments. For ResNets and DenseNets, we
adopt the standard architectures as described in previous
works [44], [45], and simply freeze all batch normalization
layers during both training and testing to break the the
inter-batch dependency as described in Section 4.4.1. Hyper-
parameters λ, c, and d are casually tuned on the hold-
out validation set as described in Section 4.1, and final
error rates are reported using models trained on the full
training set of 50k images. Table 4 summarizes results for
CIFAR-10 experiments. For fair comparison we also show
data augmentation strategies in the last column of Table 4.
Majority of methods use horizontal flip and random crop,
while Tang et al. [13] use horizontal flip and color jitter,
which may partially explain the surprisingly low error rate
(11.9%) obtained with LeNet. In most test cases considering
the same architecture and data augmentation strategy, our
regularizer produces lower error rates than all other com-
petitive methods. The only exception is EM-Softmax with
LiuNet, which achieves 4.98% error (ours 5.85%). However,
their result is obtained on an ensemble of 2 LiuNet models,
while our results are measured on a single LiuNet model
without any ensemble. Moreover, it can be seen that our
method also provides significant absolute improvements to
all six reference models with different architectures.
4.4.3 CIFAR-100
Similar to the CIFAR-10 experiment, we also evaluate
our method on LeNet, NIN, LiuNet, ResNet-20/56, and
TABLE 5
CIFAR-100 Test Error Rates
Method Architecture Error (%) Margin Augmentation
DisturbLabel [42] LeNet 41.84 - hflip & crop
CRN [17] VGG16 34.4 - -
L-Softmax [15] LiuNet 29.53 - -
L-Softmax [15] LiuNet 28.04 a - hflip & crop
EM-Softmax [16] LiuNet 24.04 b - hflip & crop
Reference LeNet 43.30 0.11 hflip & crop
Ours LeNet 41.68 0.23 hflip & crop
Reference NIN 37.75 0.12 hflip & crop
Ours NIN 34.49 0.21 hflip & crop
Reference LiuNet 26.87 0.10 hflip & crop
Ours LiuNet 25.91 0.18 hflip & crop
Reference ResNet-20 33.20 0.05 hflip & crop
Ours ResNet-20 32.96 0.16 hflip & crop
Reference ResNet-56 26.70 0.06 hflip & crop
Ours ResNet-56 26.54 0.14 hflip & crop
Reference DenseNet-40 25.93 0.04 hflip & crop
Ours DenseNet-40 25.62 0.11 hflip & crop
a We copy the result from a non-official implementation [16], since the
original paper [15] does not provide such result for CIFAR-100 with data
augmentation.
b Ensemble of 2 LiuNet models are used.
TABLE 6
SVHN Test Error Rates
Method Architecture Error (%) Margin Augmentation
DisturbLabel [42] LeNet 3.27 - crop
Reference LeNet 3.32 0.45 crop
Ours LeNet 3.12 0.99 crop
Reference NIN 2.67 0.48 crop
Ours NIN 2.46 1.14 crop
Reference LiuNet 1.79 0.50 crop
Ours LiuNet 1.61 1.24 crop
Reference ResNet-20 1.91 0.40 crop
Ours ResNet-20 1.82 1.17 crop
Reference ResNet-56 1.72 0.54 crop
Ours ResNet-56 1.63 1.04 crop
Reference DenseNet-40 1.79 0.46 crop
Ours DenseNet-40 1.66 0.99 crop
DenseNet-40 for CIFAR-100. LeNets, NINs, ResNets and
DenseNets are kept the same with the CIFAR-10 experiment
except that the output widths of the last fully-connected
layers are increased from 10 to 100 for 100-way classification.
For LiuNet, we adopt the CIFAR-100 LiuNet architecture
described in [15], which is slightly larger than the CIFAR-10
LiuNet for a fair comparison. The hyper-parameter tuning
and final evaluation protocol are the same with all previ-
ous experiments in this paper. Results are summarized in
Table 5. As the original L-Softmax paper [15] only provides
results without data augmentation on CIFAR-100, we copy
the result from [16], as denoted by superscript “a” in the
table. It can be seen that our method outperforms Distur-
bLabel [42] and L-Softmax [15] under the same architectures.
Again, EM-softmax [16] achieves a lower error rate 26.86%
than ours 25.91% using model ensembling, while we only
measure single model performance. For all six considered
architectures, our method is able to provide performance
gain to the reference model.
4.4.4 SVHN
For SVHN, we still validate our method on the same six
architectures as in CIFAR-10 experiments. The protocol for
hyper-parameter tuning and final evaluation is also the
same. Since SVHN is a digit classification task where the
semantics of a sample is generally not kept if we flip it
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TABLE 7
ImageNet top-1 Validation Error Rates
Method Architecture Margin Error (%)
Reference ResNet-18 0.70 30.23
Ours ResNet-18 1.33 29.94
Reference ResNet-50 0.82 23.85
Ours ResNet-50 1.74 23.54
Reference SENet-50 1.19 22.37
Ours SENet-50 1.92 22.19
horizontally, we do not use flip for data augmentation for
this dataset. Table 6 summarizes the results of our SVHN ex-
periments. Many of our considered competitive methods do
not perform SVHN experiments, hence we do not have their
results in the table. For LeNet, our method achieves lower
error (3.12%) than DisturbLabel (3.27%). Compared with
reference models, our method is able to provide consistent
performance improvement for all six network architectures.
4.4.5 ImageNet
ImageNet is a large-scale image classification benchmark
dataset containing millions of high resolution images in 1000
classes. We test our method on it using three DNN architec-
tures: ResNet-18/50 [44] and SENet-50 [48]. For efficiency,
we collect well-trained models from the community 5, and
fine-tune them with our regularizer. Results are summarized
in Table 7. We see our method provides consistent accuracy
gain for all considered architectures, validating the effective-
ness of our regularizer on large-scale datasets with modern
DNN architectures.
4.5 Computational Cost
Since our method invokes iterative updates to approximate
the classification margin and it utilizes high-order gradients
during optimization, higher computational cost may be
inevitable. In practice, our method usually requires 6-14×
more wall clock time per epoch and 2-4×GPU memory than
the natural cross-entropy training, depending on the net-
work architecture. Notice that much less epochs are required
when fine-tuning a pre-trained model, thus we advocate a
two-step training pipeline as introduced in Section 4.4.5 for
large-scale problems.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the generalization ability of DNNs
and aim at improving it, by investigating the classification
margin in the input data space, and deriving a novel and
principled regularizer to enlarge it. We exploit the DeepFool
adversarial perturbation as a proxy for the margin, and
incorporate the `2 norm-based perturbation into the regu-
larizer. The proposed regularization can be jointly optimized
with the original classification objective, just like training a
recursive network. By developing proper aggregation func-
tions and shrinkage functions, we improve the classification
margin in a direct way. Extensive experiments on MNIST,
CIFAR-10/100, SVHN and ImageNet with modern DNN
architectures demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
5. https://github.com/Cadene/pretrained-models.pytorch
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TABLE 1
Hyper-parameters for Different Regularizer Configurations
Aggregation Shrinkage λ c d
AVG LIN 1 4 4
AVG INV 32 4 2
AVG EXP 32 2 2
MIN LIN 1 0.5 4
MIN INV 32 1 0.5
MIN EXP 32 2 1
TABLE 2
Some Hyper-parameters in the Training process
Dataset Architecture Batch #Epoch Init lr Lr decay @epoch (multiplier) Scratch
MNIST
MLP 100 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) yes
LeNet 100 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) yes
LiuNet 100 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) no
CIFAR-10
LeNet 100 160 5e-3 100 (0.1x), 140 (0.01x) yes
NIN 100 400 5e-3 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
LiuNet 100 400 5e-3 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
ResNet-20 128 400 1e-2 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
ResNet-56 128 400 1e-2 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
DenseNet-40 128 400 1e-2 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
CIFAR-100
LeNet 100 160 5e-3 100 (0.1x), 140 (0.01x) yes
NIN 100 400 5e-3 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
LiuNet 100 400 5e-3 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
ResNet-20 128 400 1e-2 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
ResNet-56 128 400 1e-2 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
DenseNet-40 128 400 1e-2 250 (0.1x), 350 (0.01x) no
SVHN
LeNet 100 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) yes
NIN 100 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) no
LiuNet 100 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) no
ResNet-20 128 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) no
ResNet-56 128 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) no
DenseNet-40 128 100 5e-3 50 (0.1x), 80 (0.01x) no
ImageNet ResNet-18 32 10 1e-2 5 (0.1x), 8 (0.01x) no
ResNet-50 32 10 1e-2 5 (0.1x), 8 (0.01x) no
SENet-50 32 20 1e-2 10 (0.1x), 15 (0.01x) no
APPENDIX A
HYPER-PARAMETERS IN THE MNIST EXPLORAT-
ORY EXPERIMENTS
In this paper we perform grid search on hyper-parameters
λ, c and d for each combination of aggregation function and
shrinkage function on MLP models. Table 1 shows obtained
values for these three hyper-parameters.
APPENDIX B
SOME HYPER-PARAMETERS FOR TRAINING
Table 2 summarizes some hyper-parameters in the training
protocol, including the batch size, number of epochs, initial
learning rate and how it decays.
APPENDIX C
DISCUSSION FOR [1]
A contemporaneous work known as MMA [1] also attempts
to maximize the margin in the input space, for model robust-
ness just like in [2]. Although it shares the similar ambition
(i.e., input space margin maximization) to our work, there
are important differences:
• It aims to maximize the average margin. As ex-
plained and demonstrated in our Section 3.2 and
Section 3.3, simply optimizing the average margin
may hurt the generalization performance, and the
MMA-trained models indeed achieves lower accura-
cies on clean test images than the naturally trained
counterparts (e.g., they report at most 89.4% test
accuracy, while the naturally trained model shows
∼95.8%). By contrast, we develop various shrinkage
and aggregation functions to fulfill the theoretical re-
quirement, and our experiments also show improved
generalization performance on all test cases.
• To calculate the gradient of the margin-related term,
MMA utilizes the alignment between margin maxi-
mization and adversarial training, while we instead
backward through the attacking mechanism.
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